Marquette Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 4 Volume 2, Issue 4 (1918)

Article 4

Statute of Frauds
Victor H. Glanz

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
Repository Citation
Victor H. Glanz, Statute of Frauds, 2 Marq. L. Rev. 144 (1918).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol2/iss4/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

be permitted to have such an examination on the mere suspicion
that he may discover facts on which to base a case or a defense.
He should, before commencing such an examination, have some
good grounds to believe that the examination will result in disclosing details of evidence on which he can base a claim or a
defense in conjunction with the facts or information theretofore
in his possession. With such grounds and purpose, his fishing
for such details of evidence is, in the writer's opinion, perfectly
proper, and is contemplated by such statute.
MAX W. NOHL,
Member of Milwaukee Bar.

SUBSECTION 2 OF SECTION 2307 OF THE
WISCONSIN STATUTES
This section of the statute of frauds is as follows:
Agreements, what must be written. Section 2307. In the
following case every agreement shall be void unless such
agreement or some memorandum thereof, expressing the
consideration, be in writing and subscribed by the party
charged therewith:
(I)

...

.............................................

(2) Every special- promise to answer for the debt, default
or miscarriage of another person.
(3) ................................................
From its very language it will be seen that it involves only
a promise to pay the original debt of not the promisor, but the
debt of an obligor under a then existing obligation, or the prospective debt of an original obligor of a contemplated obligation.
This distinction is well illustrated in the oft given example with
which the law student is first acquainted when studying this section in contracts: If A enters a store with B and asks the proprietor to sell goods to B, saying that "if B does not pay for
them, I will", or "B owes a debt to you and if he does not pay,
I will", that is such a special promise to answer for the debt of
another as to be within the letter of the statute and in order to
be valid must comply with the requirements expressed in the
statute. B is the principal debtor and the obligation to pay is his,
which obligation, however, also becomes A's if B fails to pay.
An illustration of this can be found in Reynolds vs. Carpenter,
3 Pinney, 34, where this statute was first construed in this state.
The defendant, a contractor, orally promised the plaintiff, a
144
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keeper of a boarding house, that he would pay the amount of
certain board bills due the plaintiff from laborers who were to
work for him. It was held to be clearly within the statute and
that evidence of such oral promise was not admissible.
Again, if A says "sell B goods and I will pay for them", it
is not a special promise to pay B's debt, but to pay his own (A's),
as he assumed to pay without B obligating himself. This is illustrated in Hull vs. Brown, 35 Wis. 653,r where an agent, who sold
a machine to the plaintiff, promised that if the machine was not
satisfactory and plaintiff had to pay the note which he had given
to agent's employer, he would reimburse him, was held liable on
his promise as an original undertaking, as his employer never
obligated himself to refund the money. See Champion vs. Doty,
31 Wis. 19o. So also where defendant, under a tentative sale,
promised plaintiff that he would reimburse him for moneys which
he was to advance to the laborers, it was held that such promise
to reimburse was not to pay the debt of the laborers to plaintiff
(which contention was advanced) but to repay to plaintiff sums
advanced for the benefit of the defendant and valid. McCord vs.
Edward Hines Lbr. Co., 124 Wis. 509.
Stumpf, 129 Wis. 476.

See also Kaufer vs.

To be within this section of the statute of frauds the promise
must be in substance a guaranty which may be defined as follows:
"A contract whereby one person, the guarantor, promises another person, to be answerable in the event of a third
person, the principal debtor, making default in respect to a
liability incurred or to be incurred by such third person to
the promisee."
His liability is wholly contingent upon the original debtor's
failuie to pay. The creditor can resort to him then only.
The purpose of this article is to show what constructions
have been placed upon this statute with reference to the various
facts involved in the promises sued upon.
As the most difficult problem is to decide which promises are
not within the statute it might be logical to mention these cases
first.
PROMISES NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE.
In Hall vs. Wood, 3 Pinney 308, Wood, the plaintiff in the
court below, sold oxen to Bullard. At the time of sale Hall
told Wood that if he would let Bullard have the oxen, he, Hall,
would pay for them. The proof was clear that Wood would not
145
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let Bullard have them until Hall agreed to pay for them. The
court, in deciding that the promise was not within the statute,
declared the question to be determined by ascertaining to whom
the "original credit" was given. If it was given to Bullard it
would be within the statute and void, but if to Hall, which was
evidenced by Wood not wanting to give the oxen to Bullard until
Hall agreed to pay for them and that he never intended to look
to Bullard for payment, but only to Hall, it was not within the
statute. See McCartney vs. Hubbell, 52 Wis. 360. A promise of
a contractor with merchants to pay orders and time-checks issued
by a sub-contractor to his employes (sub-contractors) for which
the merchant gave out stock, giving credit exclusively to the
defendant, was held to be a promise not within the statute. West
vs. O'Hara,55 Wis. 645. A promise to pay for future work for
another is not within the statute if the credit is given to the
promisor and not the person for Whom the work is done. Weisel
vs. Spence, 59 Wis. 301. In an action for specific performance
the complaint alleged that there was at one time fifty-six dollars
still owing from the plaintiff to the defendant; that the defendant
was indebted to one Page in a sum exceeding fifty-six dollars;
that it was agreed between plaintiff, defendant and Page, that if
plaintiff would give his note to Page for fifty-six dollars that
Page would credit the defendant with that amount; that the
plaintiff executed and paid the note to Page. The statute was
relied on as a defense on demurrer. It was held, without deciding
whether it was a promise within the statute, that the statute
could not be successfully interposed as the agreement had been
fully executed and performed. Story vs. Menzie, 3 Pinney 329.
It could not possibly have been decided to be such promise, as to
the writer's mind there could be no clearer case of novation by
which the debt is discharged as to the original debtor and becomes
the promisor's. See Emerick vs. Sanders, I Wis. 77, 96; Cotteril vs. Stevens, io Wis. 422; Cook vs. Barrett, 15 Wis. 66o;
Rietzloff vs. Grover, 91 Wis. 65.
In Putney vs. Farnham, 27 Wis. 187, Farnham owed C, and
C owed F and G. Farnham proposed, and all agreed, that he
pay F and G the amounts which they had coming from C. After
process had been served on Farnham as garnishee of C, he made
these payments to F and G. Held not to be a promise to answer
for the debt of C but to pay his own debt in a particular manner.
This could also be sustained (as it fundamentally is) on the
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principle of novation, there beiig a substitution of debtors. A
contractor, under an agreement with D & B, sub-contractors,.
could pay the laborers of D & B and deduct such wages from the
amount due D & B. He told the laborers that he would "pay
them himself." He was made garnishee defendant of D & B.
He continued to pay the laborers after the service of the process.
Held not liable as he had, before the service of the process,
legally obligated himself by an original undertaking to pay the
laborers and not a promise to pay them if D & B did not. Balliet
vs. Scott, 32 Wis. 174. In these cases the practical distinction
between our statute, which provides that such agreements "shall
be void", and the English statute, which provides that "no action
shall be brought", is appreciated, as the invalidity of the contract
can be taken advantage of by persons not parties to it.
In Murphy vs. Gates, 81 Wis. 370, one B was arrested in a
former action. Plaintiff was his attorney. Defendant was surety
on B's bond for his appearance. B left the state. Plaintiff made
a motion for the vacation of the order of arrest, which motion was
denied, and took an appeal. The defendant promised to pay
$200 to the plaintiff for the purpose of such appeal. On this
agreement alone plaintiff proceeded with the case. Defendant's
promise was held to be a valid promise, not within the statute,
as there was consideration moving to him by reason of his interest
in the outcome of the appeal. An agreement with an attorney to
pay for services to be rendered in the defense of a third person,
made before any substantial work had been done on the case, is
not an engagement to answer for the debt of another. James vs.
Carson, 94 Wis. 632.
In Drovers Deposit National Bank vs. Tichenor, the defendants, who were stockholders in the Tichenor-Grand Company, in
an agreement reciting their interest and their desire to assist it
in getting credit, promised, in writing, that if the plaintiff bank
would discount certain promissory notes held by the company
and made by one Nicholson, they would pay them at maturity.
Such writing was held to be not a mere collateral agreement to
answer for the debt of another, but an original promise to pay
what, under the agreement, would become their debt. As at the
time of the agreement there was no debt in favor of the plaintiff, it could not be such a promise. That an instrument, even
though called a "guaranty", is not necessarily such but that its
nature should determine its character rather than the name
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applied to it. The consideration for such a promise where there
is no existing debt may be a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee (which is the consideration sufficient to
create any contractual liabilities), in this case it being a detriment to the promisee, as it parted with its money relying on the
promise. 156 Wis. 251.
Where accommodation makers returned th6ir security to the
maker, and the defendant, in consideration thereof, executed the
following: "I hereby guarantee the above named C & S harmless for damages or liabilities in consequence thereof in case they
allow said B to manage the place himself", the court held this
was an original undertaking assuming to pay the note for them
and not an undertaking to pay if they did not. Consideration
here was detriment to promisee. A promise to indemnify a surety,
which is made by third person, at whose request and upon whose
credit the surety enters into his engagement, is not within the
statute. Shook vs. Vanmatter, 22 Wis. 532, analogous to Drover's
Deposit National Bank vs. Tichenor. Vogel vs. Melms, 31 Wis.
306, was based solely on the precedent of Shook vs. Vanmatter.
A promise by defendant to plaintiff to indemnify him for endorsing C's note, which was payable to plaintiff, for the purpose of
negotiation by endorsement, was held not to be void. In Cribb
vs. Houghton, 64 Wis. 333, plaintiff brought replevin for possession of collateral securities. Defendant discounted notes for the
plaintiff, but was not to be held responsible for protest and plaintiff was to stand risk of collection and there was an agreement
to keep collaterals of the plaintiff with the defendant as security
for any notes protested. It was held that the plaintiff's promise
as indemnifying the defendant was not within the statute.
A trustee for creditors, who promised the plaintiff that if he
did not file a lien he would pay him, was held liable on his promise
as an original undertaking even though plaintiff said "if I don't
get my money for M & B, I shall look to you." The decision was
based on Dyer vs. Gibson, 16 Wis. 557, where a promise (like the
one here), in form a promise to pay the debt of another, was an
original undertaking supported by a new consideration moving
to the promisor. The release of the lien increased his commissions. Young vs. French, 35 Wis. III. "Where the party promising has for his object some benefit and advantage accruing to
himself, and on that consideration makes the promise, this distinguishes the case of an original undertaking from one within

STATUTE OF FRAUDS
the statute." Weisel vs. Spence, 59 Wis. 3O; Clapp vs. Webb,
52 Wis. 638; Hoile vs. Bailey, 58 Wis. 434. Also Gray vs. Herman, 75 Wis. 453. In Drover's Deposit NationalBank vs. Tichenor, supra, the promise was not to pay an existing debt but to
assume to pay the debt which was to be created on the strength
of their promise and became an original promise to pay their own
debt. The law laid down in that case that a consideration may
be either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee
should not be considered to overrule what was said in Weisel vs.
Spence and the other cases cited above as those were promises of

guaranty and to support them the consideration must move to
the promisor. Dyer vs. Gibson, supra, was modified to the extent
that it is not necessary that the original debtoi have no interest
in the promise or derives no benefit therefrom. Hoile vs. Bailey,
58 Wis. 434; Clapp vs..Webb, 52 Wis. 638; Young vs. French,
supra;Putney vs. Farnham,27 Wis. 187. So also a promise to
release a lien, if made with the view and with the result of
obtaining a benefit to the promisor, the mortgagee of the chattel,
is not within the statute, although the original debtor is not
released from liability. Weisel vs. Spence, supra., See also Kelly
vs. Schupp, 6o Wis. 76. Where plaintiff, who had a bill of sale
of a part of a debtor's personal property, made an agreement
with him and defendant by which the debtor transferred all his
personal property to the defendant, including that covered by the
bill of sale, who, in consideration of such release and transfer,
orally promised to pay the debt to plaintiff, it was held that,
though in form a promise to pay the debt of another, the new
consideration passing to him made it a valid promise and not
within the statute. Also that it was a promise to pay his own
debt in a particular manner. Green vs. Hadfield, 89 Wis. 138.
Forbearance by a sub-contractor to file a lien which he erroneously thinks he has a right to file, is a good consideration moving
to the owner for his promise to pay and the new consideration
takes it without the statute. Hewitt vs. Currier, 63 Wis. 385;
Young vs. French, 35 Wis. III. In Wyman vs. Goodrich, 26
Wis. 21, the owner of a note, as part of the terms of the sale
thereof, guaranteed its payment in writing without expressing
the consideration. Held not to be within the statute, as there
was sufficient consideration passing to the promisor. So also
Eagle M. and R. Machine Co. vs. Shattuck, 53 Wis. 455. The
giving up of assets by a guardian to a ward who became of age,
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in consideration of his release as guardian of that ward and the
assumption by the former ward of the guardian's liability to the
remaining ward is sufficient consideration moving to the promisor
to be a valid obligation not within the statute. Martin vs. Davis,
8o Wis. 376. Where a partnership is formed to carry on the
business formerly conducted by one of the partners, an oral
agreement, that as a part consideration of admission to the firm
the one taken in shall assume as a partner his share of the existing debts and that they shall be paid by the firm, is valid, sufficient consideration passing to the promisor. Clasgens vs. Silber,
93 Wis. 579.
A promise of a grantee, as part of the purchase price, to
assume and pay an existing mortgage on the land is not a promise
to pay the debt of another but to pay his own debt to a person
other than his original creditor (grantor). Morgan vs. South
Milwaukee Lake View Co., 97 Wis. 275. So also where defendant purchased from the mortgagees of M, an insolvent, his stock
of goods under an agreement to pay the mortgagees the amount
of their claim, it was held that the promise was not to pay the
debt of M, but to pay his own purchase price for the goods
received by him. Lessel vs. Zillmer, 105 Wis. 334. An oral
agreement to pay certain debts of the grantor in consideration
for the transfer of the property to the promisor is not a promise
to answer for the debt of another but to pay his debt owing to
the grantor to another. Fosha vs. O'Donnell, 120 Wis. 336.
While in these four last cases the court decided that it was not
a promise to pay the debt of another but to pay his own debt,
the result could also be sustained, even though construed to be
such a promise, by reason of the new and sufficient consideration of benefit to the promisor.
The basis of the "new consideration" rule is that when one
person, for a valuable consideration, engages with another to do
some act for the benefit of a third person, the latter may maintain an action against him for a breach of such engagement.
Bassett vs. Hughes, 43 Wis. 319.
PROMISES WITHIN THE STATUTE.
(Oral promises to answer for the existing debt of another, without a new and sufficient consideration passing
to the promisor.)
Where W sold lime to K to construct a building for M and,
after the sale of the lime, M orally promised to pay W for the
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lime, such promise was held to be to answer for the debt of
another and void unless complying with the statutory requirements or unless proof of new and sufficient consideration passing
to the promisor be shown. McDonell vs. Dodge, io Wis. io6. A,
being indebted, left property in the possession of B to sell and
pay his debts, and B afterward orally promised S to pay him the
debt which A owed to him. The promise was void, there being a
subsisting debt and no new consideration passing to the promisor.
Emmerick vs. Sanders, I Wis. 77. Plaintiff had a sum of money
coming from a railroad which had deeded its property in trust
under a mortgage to the defendant. Defendant promised, orally,
that if the plaintiff would procure the passage of a resolution by
the railroad authorizing the defendant to pay such sum it would
pay him. The plaintiff procured the passage of such a resolution.
It was held to be a promise to pay the still subsisting debt of the
railroad company without a new consideration having passed to
the promisor. Osborne vs. Farmers Loan and Trust Company,
16 Wis. 35. An oral promise by a widow to pay the note of her
dead husband is a promise to pay the debt of another and void.
Hoefflinger vs. Stafford, 38 Wis. 391. Where the benefit to the
promisor was merely incidefital and not the object of the promise,
such promise is void, if not in writing and expressing a consideration. Clapp vs. Webb, 52 Wis. 638. An oral promise by
the president of a village board to pay the plaintiffs in case of
their inability to collect from the village was held to be void, no
consideration being shown which would be of benefit or advantage to him. Hooker vs. Russell, 67 Wis. 257. If the original
debtor is not released from liability, an oral promise by a third
person to pay the debt, in consideration that the creditor will
release a lien which he holds upon the property of the debtor,
when no benefit accrues thereby to such third person, is within
the statute and void. Gray vs. Herman, 75 Wis. 453. Where
mortgagees released their lien and allowed the receiver of the
insolvent debtor to sell the property on his oral promise, both as
receiver and personally, to pay them, it appearing that he personally received no benefit from such release, it was held to be
void. Bray vs. Parcher, 8o Wis. 16. This case may be distinguished from Young vs. French, supra, on the ground of commissions being a benefit to the promisor. In Malone vs. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 88 Wis. 542, plaintiff, a surgeon, attended an
injured employe of defendant; after part of the services had been
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rendered and charged on plaintiff's books against the employe,
defendant's manager said, "take care of Jim. We intend to see
him through." Eeld, that if this was a promise to pay for plaintiff's services it was not valid as to services already rendered, as
not complying with the statutory requirements. Where the agreement out of which the promise arose is void by section 23o2 of
the statutes, the promise being oral and to pay the debt of another,
it is void under sub-section 2 of section 2307. Kaufer vs. Stumpf,
129 Wis., 476, 483.
(Written promises to answer for the debt of another
which express a consideration and are valid.)
Where a writing asking a bank to let son overdraw is in substance a guaranty and collateral to the liability to be incurred by
the son, the consideration is sufficiently expressed. Miami County
Bank vs. Goldberg, 133 Wis. 175. "I hereby guarantee the collection of the within note, for value received", is a sufficient
expression of consideration. Day vs. Elmore; Dahlman vs. Hammel, 45 Wis. 466; Jansen vs. Kuenzi, 145 Wis. 473. "I hereby
guarantee payment of all goods Fass may buy from B. Young
and Son", and signed, was held to be a sufficient expression of
consideration, it being the sale of goods to Fass. Young vs.
Brown, 53 Wis. 333. "Clark will purchase a small stock of goods
from you which I hope you will sell him cheap. I have no doubt
he will make you a valuable customer. I hereby guarantee the
collection of any amount which you credit him with, not exceeding $2ooo", and signed, was held to be a sufficient expression of
the consideration. Eastman vs. Bennett, 6 Wis. 232. A covenant
under seal imports a consideration and the promisor is bound.
Kurner vs. Smith, io8 Wis. 549. The Word "account" in a
written guaranty, when it refers to an indebtedness to be created,
sufficiently expresses the consideration. If it referred to an existing indebtedness, the "account" or original debt would be the
consideration and this is void. Waldheim vs. Miller, 97 Wis. 300.
The consideration is gathered from the memoranda relating to
future sales. See also Coxe Bros. vs. Millard, no Wis. 499;
Scollard vs. Bach, 136 Wis. 63. Taking over of business, where
recited in written guaranty, and forbearance on the part of the
promisee from proceeding and levying on goods of original
debtor, is sufficient expression of consideration. Roundy, Peckham & Dexter Co. vs. Baldwin, 161 Wis. 342. Also Williams vs.
Ketchum, 19 Wis. 231.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

(Promises to answer for the debt of another though
being in writing, do not express a consideration.)
In Bank of Commerce vs. Ross, 91 Wis. 320, a written
promise to pay an existing debt was held void, no consideration
for the promise being expressed. The original debt is not sufficient consideration. Where it appears that a lease is not a joint
contract, a promise in writing "to become security for the prompt
payment of the rent" must express a consideration. The lease
itself is not sufficient consideration. Hutson vs. Field, 6 Wis.
407. A debtor having two creditors, plaintiff and defendant, gave
the latter a chattel mortgage on his stock of goods and the agent
of the defendant, who had conducted the transaction, went to the
plaintiff and verbally agreed that if it would forbear commencing
proceedings which it contemplated taking to enforce its claim,
the defendant would protect it up to a certain amount of its
claim. Plaintiff agreed and wrote defendant stating that the
agent had guaranteed the claim, but not stating on what consideration, and requested that it be confirmed. Defendant agreed by
letter to guarantee the same but did not state the consideration
or any consideration. The promise was held void as a promise to
pay the debt of another, without the consideration being expressed.
The promise could not be sustained on the ground of new consideration passing to the promisor as the court decided that the
extension of time by the one creditor does not constitute a sufficient consideration moving or beneficial to the promisor. Twohy
Mercantile Co. vs. Ryan Drug Company, 94 Wis. 319. Failure
to state "for value received" or any expression of consideration,
on a note by an accommodation endorser, makes it void. Commercial Nat. Bank vs. Smith, 107 Wis. 574; Parry vs. Spikes, 49
Wis. 385; Taylor vs. Pratt,3 Wis. 674. The guarantor of a correspondence school contract, who signed a guaranty which
expressed no consideration was not held to his promise. International Text Book Co. vs. McKone, 133 Wis. 200.
From the decisions reviewed here it might be safe to say that:
i. Where, at the time of the promise, whether oral or
written, there is no debt owing to the promisee and the
promisee relying on the promise gives exclusive credit to
the promisor, it is not within the statute as not being to
answer for the debt of another. (Hall vs. Wood; Champion
vs. Doty; Hull vs. Brown; West vs. O'Hara; Weisel vs.
Spence; Drover's Deposit National Bank vs. Tichenor.
Also James vs. Carson.) Here the consideration may be
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either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the
promisee.
2. Where, at the time of the promise, there is no debt
owing to the promisee, a promise to indemnify the promisee
against a liability which lie may incur, is not a promise to
answer for the debt of another. (Shook vs. Vanmatter;
Vogel vs. Melms; Cribb vs. Houghton.)
3. An oral promise to pay the debt of a grantor, as
part consideration of the purchase price, is not to pay the
debt of the grantor, but promisor's own debt in a particular
manner. (Morgan vs. South Milwaukee Lake View Company; Fosha vs. O'Donnell; Lessel vs. Zillmer; Green vs.
Hadfield.) As said before, the validity of these promises
could also be sustained on the theory of new and sufficient
consideration passing to the promisor.
4. Where the original debtor is discharged by a novation, there being no debt for which the promisor promises
to answer, it is not within the statute, but a promise to pay
his own debt. (Emmerick vs. Sanders; Cotterill vs. Stevens;
Cook vs. Barrett; Putney vs. Farnham; Balliet vs. Scott;
Rietaloff vs. Grover.)
5. If original debtor is discharged and promise to pay
is in consideration of such discharge it need not be in writing, nor need there be new consideration passing to the
promisor as there is no debt of another for which he promises to pay and the discharge being a detriment to the
promisee it is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of an
original contract. (Willard vs. Bosshardt, 68 Wis. 454;
Gray vs. Herman; Bray vs. Parcher.)
6. While the fact that the original debtor is still liable
will not prevent the oral promise from being an original
undertaking if there is new and sufficient consideration passing to the promisor, (Hoile vs. Bailey; Weisel vs. Spence),
still, the discharge of the original debtor, ought, as a matter
of construction, prevent it from being a promise to pay the
debt of another.
7. Where there is an existing debt and an oral promise
to pay, without new and sufficient consideration passing to
the promisor, it is void. (Reynolds vs. Carpenter; Emmerick vs. Sanders: McDonnell vs. Dodge; Osborne vs.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Company; Hooker vs. Russell;
Clapp vs. Webb; Gray vs. Herman; Bray vs. Parcher.)
8. Where there is an existing debt and an oral promise,
though in form to pay the debt of the original debtor, the
promise is valid if there is a new and sufficient consideration passing and beneficial to the promisor, whether from
the promisee or original debtor, which consideration, benefit
or advantage was the object of the promisor when making
the promise and not merely incidental by reason of the
154
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promise. (Dyer vs. Gibson; Young vs. French; Weisel vs.
Spence; Clapp vs. Webb; "IHoile vs. Bailey; Gray vs. Herman; Putney vs. Farnham; Wyman vs. Goodrich; Eagle
M. & P. Machine Co. vs. Shattuck; Hewitt vs. Currier;
Martin vs. Davis; Bassett vs. Hughes; Murphy vs. Gates;
Clasgens vs. Si~ber; Hooker vs. Russell; Bray vs. Parcher;
Twohy Mercantile Co. vs. Ryan Drug Co.)
9. The fact that by reason of the oral promise, where
consideration passes and is beneficial to the promisor, the
original debtor is incidentally benefited, is no objection to
the necessity of the rule of new and sufficient consideration
passing to the promisor. (Hoile vs. Bailey; Putney vs.
Farnham; overruling Dyer vs. Gibson.)
io. Where a debt is to be incurred and an oral promise
guaranteeing its payment is made, exclusive credit not
being given to the promisor, the debt itself is not sufficient
consideration to take it without the statue.
ii. Where there is an existing debt or where the
promise is to pay a debt to be incurred, the exclusive credit
not being given to the promisor, but he is considered a
guarantor, if in writing and expressing a consideration,
whether passing to the promisor, promisee or original
debtor, the promise is not within the statute. (Miami Bank
vs. Goldberg; Young vs. Brown; Waldheim vs. Miller;
Eastman vs. Bennett; Roundy, etc., vs. Baldwin; Coxe Bros.
vs. Milbrath; Scollard vs. Bach; Day vs. Elmore; Dahhnan
vs. Hammel; Jansen vs. Kuenzi.)
12. Where the written promise mentioned in (ii) does
not state a consideration it is void. (Commercial National
Bank vs. Smith; Parry vs. Spikes; Taylor vs. Pratt; International Text Book Co. vs. McKone, 133 Wis. 2oo; Klee
vs. Stephenson. 130 Wis. 505; Hutson vs. Field; Twohy
vs. Ryan.)
13. Where there is an existing debt and a written
promise to pay, the consideration of the existing debt without a new consideration is not sufficient to take it without
the statute. (Bank of Commerce vs. Ross; Waldheim vs.

Miller.)
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